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Abstract 
This paper analyzes innovation in perspective of system and network and offers a full-scale view of innovation holistically 
and connectedly. Fundamental elements, conditions and steps of innovation are discussed according to system organization 
theory. The function of innovation is to help solve the demanders’ problem and the value of it is the rate between function 
and expense. The optimal price is derived by a competitive game deduced from system analysis. And then biform game is 
introduced to describe cooperation and competition relations among innovation network. This paper provides a qualitative 
and quantitative analysis framework to analyze innovation process and offers pondering frame of enterprises’ innovation 
strategy decision. 
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1. Introduction 
Innovation is one of advanced intelligent activities of human beings. Innovation is the implementation of a 
new or significantly improved ideas, goods, services, process, or practice [1]. Knowledge, product, service as 
well as idea are the results of innovation. Almost all innovations are collective activity. For example, board of 
directors, scientific research, R&D cooperation, strategy alliance and regional innovation system (RIS) are 
typical collective innovations. The research of innovation goes back to Schumpeter [2]. With biological 
evolution analogy, Nelson and Winter founded evolutionary economics to explain how enterprise evolves and 
innovation is regarded as important outcome of enterprise adaptability [3].  
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Innovation and innovation networks become increasingly complex and have attracted inter-disciplinary or 
cross-disciplinary attention, such as evolutionary economics, agent-based modeling, social network analysis, 
and economic physics [4]. System perspective is useful for understand the process of innovation. In a more 
abstract system theoretical approach, Innovation can be understood as a critical event which destabilizes the 
current state of system, and opens a new process of self-organization leading to a new stable state [4]. A tri-
partite framework is promoted which captures networks of ideas (Concept Level), people (Individual Level) 
and social structures (Social-Organizational Level) and the interactions between these levels [5]. The network 
approach seems to be particularly well-suited to describing natural and social phenomena. It seems more than 
appropriate for exploring and analyzing the complex social, technical, and natural environment of which we are 
a part. The connections among person to person or organization to organization formed innovation network 
which represents the interaction structure of agents involved in the innovation process. 
The relation between system and network concepts in innovation research is analyzed in [6]. There are 
several aspects of network research: Network as constraint of condition for individuals and other dynamic 
processes, network topology as a characteristics of the function of the system, network as a collective 
phenomena emerging from individual actions as well as a result of individual actions [4]. In this paper, 
innovation network is regarded as a innovation system at first and the emergence of new property of whole is 
the outcome of local interaction. Then, it’s function and value is determined by the interaction between network 
and environment. More specifically, it depends on the extent a certain system help certain agent or agents in 
solving its or their problem and how much the process cost. Secondly, the cost and the spillover must be shared 
by all nodes involved in the innovation process. 
Innovation is cooperation between two or more agents. For a long time, literatures on cooperation focus on 
cooperative behavior and it’s diffusion with game theory on mass population and complex networks [7-11]. 
Ultimatum game, public goods game, prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift game are often used original games to 
simulated or experimented in those literature. Special network structures are formed with cooperation and 
competitive game are with stable and efficient allocation to given payoffs [12-13]. Two-stage models are used 
in the economics of organizations which has a non-cooperative first stage and a cooperative second stage [14-
15]. As a hybrid non-cooperative-cooperative game model, biform game is proposed and sufficient condition 
for the efficient outcome is found [16]. Biform game has been used to explain competitive advantage of broker, 
cooperative advertising of supply chain relationships and investment incentives in supply chains [17-19]. By 
splitting the analysis into two stages, one corresponding to the strategic phase and the other to the competitive 
phase, the biform game incorporates both types of interactions [17].Compared to pure non-cooperative or 
cooperative game, biform game has enormous potential as a formal methodology for understanding the 
foundational issues of business policy and strategy because firm performance typically depends on both non-
cooperative (strategic) and coalitional (competitive) interactions [17]. In this paper, biform game is used to 
analyse two typical real cases in business and IT service. The results of analysis depict the situation at that time.  
2. The emerging of innovation system function 
2.1. Expression of innovation system 
A system can be defined as a complex of interacting elements [20] which form an integrated limited whole. 
Limited means each system is delineated by its spatial and temporal boundaries, surrounded and interacted with 
its environment, expressed in structure, purpose and certain functioning to its environment. Integrality is the 
fundamental feature of system, it means whole is greater than the sum of the parts. One aspect is that the 
function of part belongs to or depends on the whole, just as hands will loss the function of hand if it left live 
body. This section focuses on another aspect that system as a whole affects its environment.  
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To explain why enterprise exists, many economists such as Marshall introduced organization as the fourth 
factor of production; Clark gave the coordinating function to the entrepreneur; Knight introduced managers 
who coordinate. Coase argued that enterprise exists for minimize the cost to discovering relevant prices, 
negotiating and concluding a separate contract, producing exchanges and so on[21]. That is called transaction 
cost by latter scholars. Organization, entrepreneur and manager are the core to attract islands of conscious 
power in this ocean of unconscious cooperation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of butter milk [21]. A 
man knows that there is a demand somewhere and tell another man who has willingness to be an entrepreneur. 
Then the entrepreneur organized resources meet the demands of demander just right. The margin of enterprise 
is determined by the equilibrium of the game between organizational and producing technology of the 
entrepreneur and the demander. Perhaps the simplest model to explain the equilibrium is dual problem in linear 
programming.  
Relative to its parts, a system itself is the innovation results from interaction of all parts since some new 
thing arisen. This is the fundamental feature of system. Moreover, enterprise must experience sustained 
innovation and radical innovation if it exists persistently. Regardless of whether an enterprise adapts to 
environment changing passively or becomes industry leader proactively, innovation needs new resources and 
their combination which leads to different working manner. These resources and combinations may be aroused 
from internal and external area. To supply these resources can stimulate new demand to other enterprises. 
2.2. The condition and process to form a innovation system 
According to [22], As a organizational process, innovation includes organizational objects, power and 
instructions. Organizational objects may be existed in environment or old system and need to be found, 
identified and connected. Organizational power is the energy or ability to condense all objects it needs. 
Organizational instructions provide direction, criterion and a blueprint of the future. Organizational instructions 
formulation is an important stage for innovation which is analogous development and design stage. It is named 
heter-organization if organizational instructions come from external organization; and named self-organization 
when all instructions come from internal organization. Heter-organization is related to the process of control 
and management. Heter-organization and self-organization are not absolutely opposite and may convert each 
other. 
There are five essential conditions to form a new system [22]. The first is new demand. The second is all 
elements of new system are available for putting to use. Thirdly, the old structure composed by the elements 
will be easily de-structure to accept new elements and their interactions. Fourthly, connection among all parts 
must be unblocked to sustain the material, energy and information flow. The last is environment and 
opportunity that support to obtain objects and power easily as well as trigger innovation occurring. The first 
step of a new system is differentiation. Some elements of new system--belong to the old system inside or 
outside the enterprise and constrained by the original structure. Understanding new demand and its opportunity 
is one kind of force to attract the elements. Members will be separated when the attraction force exceeds their 
threshold. The second step is to organize the elements into a certain structure. Then form core and all sub-
functional module. The core gives instructions to subsequent activities just like brain of fetus which can 
controls most actions of a person. Gene play critical role before the core formed and still has effect after the 
core formed. The third step is to close the boundary of new system and waiting for the right time to produce 
new outcome. 
2.3. Function emerging of innovation 
Innovation emerges when a enterprise produces its outcome. Sometimes, a new outcome is not produced for 
others. For example, ARPAnet was developed for the communication of research project. Facebook was not 
855 Li Li and Bing Chen /  Procedia Computer Science  55 ( 2015 )  852 – 861 
developed for the world. Once these innovations are recognized, organizational power such as venture 
investment makes it stronger and creates diffusion channel to enlarge the brand and market share. Then there 
are more and more innovations follow it. In other occasion, innovation is towards one certain present demand 
or future demand. Usually, a new outcome satisfied a category of demands. Enterprise need to know if there is 
enough demand to ensure its BEP(break-even-point). If there are some competitors in the market, innovation 
may become more radical and the enterprise must face much uncertainty. 
Function of the outcome one enterprise supplies is to satisfy demander’s shortage, and outcome replenishes 
the resource of its task or project as input. The function to demander is same, whether the outcome is produced 
by supplier himself or supplier just introduces other suppliers. As shown in fig. 1(a) and (b). 
 
Fig. 1. (a) directed supply; (b) indirected supply 
Fig. 1(a) shows enterprise 1 supplies enterprise 2 directly. In Fig. 1(b), enterprise 1 can’t supply directly but 
he knows enterprise 3 can satisfies the demand of enterprise 2 and connected them to carry out new outcome of 
enterprise 2. It is commonly that to produce new outcome needs help from other organization or person outside 
the enterprise, since there are resource and ability gap between current status and target state. Another 
circumstance is enterprise 3 still hasn’t enough ability to supply the outcome only by itself. So enterprise 1 or 3 
organizes enterprise 4,5, and so on, to form strategic alliance and give the outcome to enterprise 2 for the 
implementation of his project. As shown in Fig 2. 
 
Fig. 2. More than one enterprise form strategic alliance 
In Fig. 2, enterprise 1, 3, 4, 5 play their own role as sub-functional modules and make the outcome reaching 
enterprise 2 at the right time and place. Situations like Fig. 2 occur at every certain period all over the world. 
Economy of one country even the world are connected by such network. Just like Read’s famous story I, Pencil 
said. The pencil details the complexity of its own creation; its components involve numerous enterprise and 
people, down to the sweeper in the factory and the lighthouse keeper guiding the shipment into port. 
3. Innovation system value and biform game of innovation network 
3.1. Cost and contribution of outcome 
Harrison White explains that markets come from the interaction between firms [23]. Suppose there are 2 
kinds of agents in the market--the producer and buyer. The volume is y and quality is n.  
The cost of production is 
dc nqynyC /);(   with q and c positive.  (1) 
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The firm’s contribution to buyer valuation is defined as 
banrynyS  );(  with r, a, and b positive.  (2) 
 Where c is the cost of production, d is how the buyer’s view to quality, b is present the desirability of buyer 
and. Fig. 3 shows the phenomenology of market context. 
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 Dispersions 
 On Volume (y) of Firm’s 
Production 
Across firms on Quality 
Index(n) 
Valuation 
Contribution of the 
product increases with 
volume, as perceived by 
the buyers(a) 
Desirability of the product 
increases with quality as 
judged by the buyers(b) 
Costs 
Cost of production 
increases as volumes(c) 
Expenses of building in the 
quality changes(+ or -) with 
increased quality(d) 
Fig.3 Phenomenology of Market Context 
There basic tradeoffs among four parameters 
Over variation in production volume
c
a
Cost
onContributi   (3) 
Over variation in producers’ quality
d
b
Expence
tyDesirabili   (4) 
Since innovation may increase quality and decrease cost at the same time, quality increasing may not lead to 
increased cost. 
3.2. Valuation of innovation 
Since Miles put forward value analysis in 1947, value is defined as the rate between the function and all 
costs to obtain this function by value engineering [24] 
C
FV    (5) 
Value of the interaction from equation (1) and (2) can be defined as contribution divided by cost 
dbcadbca nAyny
q
r
nyC
nyS    
);(
);( , with A>0  (6) 
The relation of producer and buyer is similar to that of enterprise 1 and enterprise 2 in fig. 1(a). They are 
called a joint name--nodes or vertexes with network notion. Usually in fig. 1(a), node 1 and node 2 form a new 
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system during their contract period. The function of the new system to node 2 is getting satisfied outcome from 
node 1 in time even though such function is only one of all sub-functions of node 2. There is a game between 
node 1 and node 2, as shown in fig. 4. 
  Node 2 
  Accept No accept 
Node 1 
Produce p
pf
c
cp  ,  -cˈ0 
No produce 0ˈ-p 0ˈ0 
Fig.4. Game between node 1 and node 2 
The appointed price in contract between node 1 and node 2 is p and the cost node 1 spends is c. Then payoff 
of (produce, accept) is 
),(
p
pf
c
cp  , with p, c, f positive  (7) 
Where f is the function which node 2 needs. Node 1 pay his cost c to get nothing when node 2 no accept the 
outcome and node 2 pay p to node 1 to get nothing when node 1 fail to produce the right outcome. Nash 
equilibrium of fig. 4 is If p>c and f>p. The emerging value of interaction between two nodes as a whole can be 
represented as 
cp
pfcpVm
))((    (8) 
Multiplying means both node 1 and node 2 are benefited from the interaction. Optimal pricing can be 
obtained by maximizing this value with FOC 
cfpm  *   (9) 
The whole value is also to be represented as Cobb-Douglas form 
p
pf
c
cp
c AV

 ED   (10) 
With α>1, β>1 and A negative, 0, positive according to the sign of pˉc or fˉp.  
Optimizing Vc while A>0, then 
D
E
ln
ln* cfpc     (11) 
Fig.1(b) and fig.2 can be modeled as equation (8) and (10) while other nodes except node 2 are regarded as a 
new node 1’. Then the optimal price of interaction between node 1’ and node 2 follows equation (9) and (11). 
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3.3. N-player biform game 
In fig. 1(a), new value fˉc emerges and allocated with pˉc and fˉp between node 1 and node 2. But pˉc 
must be re-allocated between node 1 and node 2 in fig. 1(b). The allocation will be more complex in occasion 
of fig. 2. pˉc must be allocated among all nodes who participate in supplicating outcome to node 2. It is 
important to attract nodes which possess complementary resources into cooperation. In fact, even in fig. 1(a), 
node 1 still experiences negotiation process to prepare outcome to node 2. So there is always a biform game for 
their interactions. 
The general definition of a biform game to model this kind of situation is given. N={1,…,n} is the finite set 
of players. F(N) denotes the power set of N. 
Definition 3.1 [16]. A n-player-biform game is a collection ),,;;,,( 11 nn VSS DD "" where  
For each i=1,…,n, }1,0{ S , 0 not in a alliance, 1 in a alliance; 
V is a map from nSS uu"1  to the set of maps from F(N) to the real, with 0))(,,( 1  )nssV "  for every 
),,,, 11 nn SSss ""  , can be regarded as value function of a coalition; and  
For each i=1,…,n, 10 dd iD , iD  is the anticipate confidence index, and indicates how well player i 
anticipates getting in cooperative games. 
If a biform game meets a certain set of condition, Nash equilibrium is efficiency. Such as AU(adding up), 
NE(no externalities) and NC(no coordination). AU means the sum of all players added value is equal to the 
overall value created in second stage cooperative game. Compared to the value definition in section 3.2, AU 
ensures linear relation among the players, can be obtained by logarithm operation from equation (8) or (10). NE 
condition says player i’s strategy doesn’t affect other players’ payoffs while without i. NC means one player 
change strategy if and only if this change can increase the total value of the second stage.  
To analyze a biform game, the following procedure is adopted [16]: 
The first stage, for every profile sęS of strategic choices and resulting cooperative game V(s), 
(a) Compute the core of V(s), and,  
(b) For each player i=1,…,n, calculate the projection of the core onto the ith coordinate axis, and  
(c) Calculate the ii DD -1˖  weighted average of the upper and lower endpoints of the projection. 
The second stage, for every profile sęS of strategic choices, and each player i=1,…,n, 
(d) Assign to i a payoff equal to i’s weighted average as in (c) above, and 
(e) Analyze the resulting strategic-form non-cooperative game. 
According to specific situation, (c) and (d) can be redesigned to make the analysis coincide to reality. 
4. Examples 
4.1. E-commerce game 
A small firm A possesses an apple orchard in Xinjiang province. For years, most of A’s apples are exported 
to Kazakhstan (K) along with other orchardists since it is their convention. Influenced by the competition of 
homogeneous products, profit has become lower and lower. The firm has a branch (N) in Nanjing to sell 
Xinjiang specialty and participated a Xinjiang moslem restaurant B. Along with the expansion of e-commerce 
and mobile e-commerce, the firm open a shop with WeChat to sale and promoting his specialty to customers 
(C). the relation among them is shown as Fig. 5(a). There are too much Xinjiang specialties being sold on 
varieties e-commerce platform. But A has superiority to connect orchards and other specialties’ suppliers (D) 
directly. With such resource, A generated an idea to integrate them to establish a new mobile e-commerce 
pattern. But A still lack of fund to introduce logistics (L) and lack of distribution channel or market to 
implement its new object. 
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Fig. 5. (a) original network of A and N; (b) New network of A and N 
N met a Tmall thirdpartnar E who has good relations with a logistics firm and told his problem. If N 
delegates his operation to E, he needs to organize supplication from Xinjiang, support unified quality testing 
and packaging style. N negotiated those problems with E. After a basic value calculation, a biform game is 
shown as fig. 6. 
  L 
  No Yes 
  E E 
  No Yes No Yes 
N 
No 
V(N, E, L)=6 
V(N)=1, V(N,E)=5 
V(E)=2, V(E,L)=4 
V(L)=3, V(L,N)=3 
1.5, 2.5, 2 
V(N, E, L)=6 
V(N)=1, V(N,E)=4 
V(E)=1, V(E,L)=3 
V(L)=3, V(L,N)=3 
5.5/3, 5.5/3, 7/3 
V(N, E, L)=6 
V(N)=1, V(N,E)=4 
V(E)=2, V(E,L)=3 
V(L)=2, V(L,N)=2 
5/3, 8/3, 5/3 
V(N, E, L) =9 
V(N)=1, V(N,E)=4 
V(E)=1, V(E,L)=4 
V(L)=2, V(L,N)=3 
8/3, 9.5/3, 9.5/3 
Yes 
V(N, E, L)=5 
V(N)=0, V(N,E)=3 
V(E)=2, V(E,L)=3 
V(L)=3, V(L,N)=3 
1, 1.5, 2.5 
V(N, E, L)=11.2 
V(N)=0, V(N,E)=6 
V(E)=1, V(E,L)=3 
V(L)=3, V(L,N)=3 
10.7/3, 12.2/3, 10.7/3 
V(N, E, L)=8.5 
V(N)=0, V(N,E)=3 
V(E)=2, V(E,L)=3 
V(L)=2, V(L,N)=6 
8/3, 6.5/3, 11/3 
V(N, E, L)=7 
V(N)=0, V(N,E)=4 
V(E)=1, V(E,L)=3 
V(L)=2, V(L,N)=4 
6.5/3, 6.5/3, 8/3 
Fig.6. E-commerce game 
In fig.6, V(#) is the value of sub-coalition in power set of {N,E,L}. Each of N, E, L has two strategies Yes or 
No. Yes stands for being willing to engage in the plan of N and No means unwilling to. Compute Shapley value 
of each strategies profile and find each cooperation game has one unique core. To solve the Nash equilibrium 
and find there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibriums: (Yes, Yes, No) and (Yes, No, Yes). And (Yes, Yes, No) 
is more efficient than (Yes, No, Yes). Both of these two equilibriums only include two of N, E, L. N and E may 
form private alliance and introduce competition to L to get more payoffs if sub-coalition is permitted. 
4.2. Software firm game 
There are three software firms A, B, C, which provide SaaS service independently to a user D. The user 
established new strategy and needs to eliminate information island. One key step is whether A, B, C open their 
interface to each other. Each of three firms with two strategies 0 and 1 to supply node 2. And at least 2 firms 
cooperation can help realize the goal of D and different combination leads to different value. Biform game is 
shown as fig.7. 
  C 
  No Yes 
  B B 
  No Yes No Yes 
N B 
K C 
A 
D E 
N A 
D 
L 
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A 
No 
V(N)=6 
V(A,B)=4 
V(B,C)=4 
V(C,A)=4 
2, 2, 2 
V(N)=5 
V(A,B)=3 
V(B,C)=3 
V(C,A)=4 
2, 1, 2 
V(N)=5 
V(A,B)=4 
V(B,C)=3 
V(C,B)=3 
2, 2, 1 
V(N) =6 
V(A,B)=3 
V(B,C)=6 
V(C,A)=3 
0, 3, 3 
Yes 
V(N)=5 
V(A,B)=3 
V(B,C)=4 
V(C,A)=3 
1, 2, 2 
V(N)=6 
V(A,B)=6 
V(B,C)=3 
V(C,A)=3 
3, 3, 0 
V(N)=6 
V(A,B)=3 
V(B,C)=3 
V(C,A)=6 
3, 0, 3 
V(N)=9 
V(A,B)=6 
V(B,C)=6 
V(C,A)=6 
3, 3, 3 
Fig.7. Software firm game 
In fig. 7, V(#) is the value of sub-coalition which takes out from all 4 players with optimal price. Compute 
the core of each cooperate game with Shapley value(unique) and put the projection in each firm at the bottom 
of the corresponding cell. To solve the first stage of non-cooperative game, there are two pure-strategy Nash 
equilibriums: (No, No, No) and (Yes, Yes, Yes). Obviously, (Yes, Yes, Yes) is efficient equilibrium. But it is 
not a risk-dominant equilibrium while it isn’t satisfied NC, any one firm changes its strategy alone will lead to 
total payoff and one of the other two firms’ payoff decreased. 
5. Conclusion 
Whether it is incremental innovation or radical innovation, innovation is a process of new system creation. 
Network is particularly well-suited to describing innovation process too. This paper analyzes innovation in 
perspective of system and network. Two perspectives can offer a full-scale view of innovation holistically and 
connectedly. 
Wholeness of the process is concerns at first and critical components of different angles are discussed with 
system framework. Innovation is regarded as a critical event of old state switch to new stable state and open a 
new developing process. This process needs new objective, new organizational form, new product and new 
function need new combination of resources. It is a process of heter-organization as well as self-organization. 
Fundamental elements of an organizational process include organizational objects, power and instructions. 
Creation of a new system must satisfied five basic conditions: new demand appearance, all elements available, 
easy to be de-structured, connected unobstructed and appropriate opportunity. There are three steps to make 
innovation happen: differentiation, organization (symbiosis, nucleation, merge) and boundary closed. The 
outcome and the improvement of enterprise or enterprise alliance are innovation. Its function is to help the 
demanders in environment solve their problem. New benefit created in the course of the cooperation of two or 
more enterprise and each can obtain a certain proportion of the profit. According to value analysis and 
engineering, the value is defined as the rate between function and expense. The value of cooperation involves 
the whole and each part--the supplier and the demander at the same time. 
Connection and structure are focused in perspective of network frame. A game is formed between supplier 
and demander, and optimal price is derived from the value. It is normal that the relationship among enterprise 
includes competition and cooperation at the same time. Biform game can describe such feature of such 
relationship. According to the anticipation of the whole value and efficient allocation of cooperative game, 
Nash equilibrium is solved to analyze and predict possible results of innovation network. Then consider the 
situation where innovation happens. It is helpful for enterprise or individual to make better strategic business 
decisions. 
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This paper provides a qualitative and quantitative analysis framework to analyze the process of innovation in 
perspective of system and network. Network games with competitive and cooperative game to form stable 
network structure are discussed [12-13]. Biform game is more suitable for explain how innovation network 
form and give advice to enterprise strategy decision. For more deep exploration of innovation network 
formation and evolution, cooperation partner select from pre-existing network in different probability [25] and 
cost will be considered. Besides Shapley value, there are several methods such as Myerson value, Owen value, 
and Talmud allocation to find cores of cooperative game. Different network structure arising from different 
allocation mechanism [26] is valuable to discover in further research. 
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